Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Business Faculty Articles and Research

Business

5-18-2021

Lady Luck: Anthropomorphized Luck Creates Perceptions of RiskSharing and Drives Pursuit of Risky Alternatives
Katina Kulow
Thomas Kramer
Kara Bentley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles
Part of the Marketing Commons, and the Other Business Commons

Lady Luck: Anthropomorphized Luck Creates Perceptions of Risk-Sharing and
Drives Pursuit of Risky Alternatives
Comments
This article was originally published in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research in 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1086/714502

Copyright
Association of Consumer Research

A D D I C T I O N A N D M A L A DA P T I V E C O N S U M P T I O N

Lady Luck: Anthropomorphized Luck Creates
Perceptions of Risk-Sharing and Drives Pursuit
of Risky Alternatives
K A T I N A K U L OW , T H O M A S K R A M E R , A N D K A R A B E N T L E Y

AB STR ACT We examine decision-making under risk as a function of the degree to which consumers anthropomorphize their luck. We propose that consumers make riskier ﬁnancial decisions when they anthropomorphize (vs. objectify)
their luck and that this effect occurs because humanizing luck engenders a perceived sharing of risk in the presence of “lady
luck.” A series of experiments shows that consumers among whom anthropomorphized versus objectiﬁed luck is salient
display greater risk-taking in ﬁnancial, but not social, decisions. These effects are heightened among consumers who frequently engage in risky decision-making and are driven by perceptions of risk-sharing produced by anthropomorphized
luck. Collectively, these ﬁndings document how anthropomorphizing luck can inﬂuence consumers’ decision-making within
the ﬁnancial domain. We discuss important consumer welfare implications associated with the negative consequences that
result from repeated detrimental consumer behaviors, particularly given the pervasive use of anthropomorphized luck by
marketers in the gambling domain.

For a change, lady luck seemed to be smiling on me. Then again, maybe the ﬁckle wench was just lulling me into a false
sense of security while she reached for a rock.
—Timothy Zahn

F

or better or worse, the uncertainty inherent in ﬁnancial decision-making engenders risk. Investing in relatively risky stocks versus safer bonds can generate
great gains, but—as most recently demonstrated by the
March 2020 stock market declines—can also result in devastating losses. Further, consumers regularly have to choose between spending money in the present for immediate pleasure
versus delaying gratiﬁcation and saving for the future. All too
often, such consumer decisions result in harmful behaviors, including excessive and uncontrolled buying (O’Guinn and Faber 1989; Dittmar 2005), addictive buying (Scherhorn, Reisch,
and Raab 1990), or compulsive gambling (Cherkasova et al.
2018). Consistent with research documenting the implications of maladaptive consumption related to interactions
with belongings (Rifkin and Berger 2021) and the pursuit
of perfectionism (Chang, Jain, and Reimann 2021), maladaptive consumption behaviors in the ﬁnancial domain

can also have severe implications for consumer welfare, such
as emotional turmoil and depression (Richardson, Elliott,
and Roberts 2013), bankruptcy (van Ooijen and van Rooij
2016), interpersonal conﬂicts and increased divorce rates
(Dingfelder 2008), and illicit drug use (Sinha 2009). Unfortunately, the negative consequences of risky ﬁnancial decisions appear widespread. For example, 23% of respondents
in a recent ﬁnancial health survey reported experiencing
ﬁnance-related posttraumatic stress disorder (Ashford 2016).
Further, 51% of working adults have minimal savings to cover
expenses beyond one missed paycheck (Passy 2019), illustrating the precarious ﬁnancial situation many consumers are in.
Simply put, risky ﬁnancial decisions have signiﬁcant repercussions for consumer welfare.
Extant research on potential inﬂuences on ﬁnancial
decision-making has investigated psychological factors, including sensation-seeking (Zuckerman and Kuhlman 2000)
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and beliefs toward money (Sekścińska 2015), and situational
factors, such as one’s presence in online communities (Zhu
et al. 2012) and feelings of social exclusion (Duclos, Wan,
and Jiang 2013). The current research seeks to add to this
stream of literature by proposing a novel antecedent to consumers’ pursuit of riskier over safer ﬁnancial alternatives: their
propensity to anthropomorphize luck. Speciﬁcally, risk-seeking
tends to be greater among consumers who are in the presence
of others that can provide a sense of security (Chou and
Nordgren 2017), and anthropomorphized luck—often referred to as lady luck—may represent the presence of such
a person who not only provides a sense of security, but also
shares the risk associated with the decision. Thus, we argue
that increased accessibility of anthropomorphized (vs. objectiﬁed) luck can lead consumers to be more likely to pursue
higher-risk alternatives. Further, we propose that preferences for higher-risk options are driven by shared risk perceptions that—as illustrated by the introductory quote—
might engender feelings of security provided by lady luck.
Consistent with our proposition, four studies ﬁnd increased
preferences for higher- over lower-risk alternatives when
consumers anthropomorphize (vs. objectify) luck for ﬁnancial, but not social, decisions. We further show that the anthropomorphizing of luck results in riskier decisions among
those who more (vs. less) frequently engage in risky decisions—which bodes ill for consumer welfare, given that many
ﬁnancial maladaptive activities arise from repeated behaviors. Finally, we suggest that the effect of anthropomorphizing luck on risk-seeking behavior is guided by shared risk perceptions produced by anthropomorphized luck, but not by
objectiﬁed luck, thereby presumably lessening the risk borne
by the decision-maker.
Our research makes several contributions to the literature.
While research has found evidence for the role played by both
psychological and situational factors in determining risktaking, we extend the literature by identifying a novel and seemingly innocuous antecedent to consumer decision-making: the
anthropomorphizing of luck. Further, we generalize prior research on the impact of social inﬂuences on risk-taking (Levav
and Argo 2010) from the actual or perceived presence of physical entities to the mere presence of anthropomorphized nonhuman entities: lady luck. By documenting the negative effects
of anthropomorphized luck on ﬁnancial decision-making, our
ﬁndings also hold signiﬁcant public policy implications. Specifically, we demonstrate that the anthropomorphizing of luck in
messaging associated with ﬁnancial decisions may unintentionally lead to riskier decisions that could have long-term implications for consumers’ ﬁnancial and psychological welfare.

T HEO RET IC A L D EVE LO PM EN T

Uncertainty and Lack of Control
Uncertainty about probable outcomes for a decision that has
not yet occurred engenders decision risk (Sitkin and Weingart
1995). As such, risky decisions represent contexts in which
possible outcomes generally fall outside of one’s control. And
yet, the mere perception of having control has been shown
to greatly inﬂuence consumer decision-making under risk,
such that greater perceived control leads to greater risk-taking
(Renn 1998), while a loss of control shifts preferences toward
less risky alternatives (Beisswingert et al. 2016). Although consumers may try to increase control through means such as taking charge of their emotions (Heilman et al. 2010) or relying
on superstitious beliefs (Kramer and Block 2008), the uncertainty inherent in risky decisions may also drive consumers’ attempts to increase control not only by thinking of luck (Langer
1975) and the degree to which they believe it to be under their
personal control (Darke and Freedman 1997), but also by anthropomorphizing it (Epley, Waytz, and Cacioppo 2007).

Uncertainty and Luck
Luck is often conceptualized as an uncontrollable, unstable external force (Darke and Freedman 1997), used to attribute
outcomes related to chance events (Teigen 1996). Even though
luck tends to be viewed as an unpredictable external force, research has found that individuals differ in their beliefs about
luck—such that some view luck as an external force that randomly inﬂuences events, while others believe that luck is akin
to an internal quality that one can possess and control (Darke
and Freedman 1997). Although consumers may differ with
respect to how they believe luck operates, the idea of luck
as an inﬂuence on chance events is ubiquitous.
Luck has been shown to have signiﬁcant implications for
consumers. For example, priming consumers with luck-related
concepts, which temporarily changed how lucky they felt,
positively inﬂuenced both their participation in and estimates of winning a lottery (Jiang, Cho, and Adaval 2009).
Further, consumers rely more on luck, such as an increased
preference for lucky items and greater conﬁdence when using
lucky items, in the pursuit of performance (vs. learning) goals
(Hamerman and Morewedge 2015). Responses to uncertainty
and risky decisions are also subject to cultural inﬂuences. For
instance, whereas North American (vs. Asian) consumers engage in riskier decision-making when a positive event raises
their self-esteem, Asian (vs. North American) consumers become more risk-seeking as their belief in good luck strengthens (Valenzuela, Darke, and Briley 2014).
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Financial decisions and their chance outcomes are marked
by a lack of control, which increases the likelihood that luck is
brought to mind (Broncano-Berrocal 2019). Speciﬁcally, for
luck to be evoked, decision outcomes must be personally relevant, unlikely, unpredictable, and fall outside of the individual’s control (Coffman 2007)—all of which are often characteristics of ﬁnancial decisions. The notion of consumers seeking
to exert inﬂuence over randomly determined outcomes suggests
that luck is evoked to provide an illusion of control—“an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately
higher than the objective probability would warrant” (Langer
1975, 313). Two fundamental errors contribute to this illusion: people incorrectly believe that a chance event can be
controlled and that they not only possess, but can effectively
employ, the ability to inﬂuence its outcome. For instance,
Langer (1975) observed that participants reported higher resale amounts for lottery tickets they chose themselves, compared to participants who were merely given lottery tickets.
Similarly, Wohl and Enzle (2002) found that the majority
(88%) of participants in a ping pong ball drawing for a $20
gift certiﬁcate elected to pick their own ball, rather than being
given one.
Thus, risky ﬁnancial decisions often meet the criteria of
when luck might be more readily accessible—they are likely
to be viewed as highly personally relevant, with unpredictable
and uncontrollable outcomes. Interestingly, the situational factors that lead to the evocation of luck to exert control also
increase the likelihood of individuals’ attempting to control
or make sense of situations via anthropomorphism.

Uncertainty and Anthropomorphism
In contexts marked by uncertainty, consumers not only resort
to the invocation of luck (Langer 1975), but also to anthropomorphism (Kim and McGill 2011). Anthropomorphism refers
to the ascribing of human characteristics, intentions, and behaviors to nonhuman entities (Epley et al. 2007), such as inanimate objects (Chandler and Schwarz 2010). Research has
documented that consumers anthropomorphize as a means
to achieve two types of goals (Epley et al. 2007)—social
goals that reﬂect their need for social connection and belonging, or—importantly—effectance goals that indicate a desire
to understand their environment, which can be achieved
through gaining a sense of control over it (White 1959). For
example, Epley and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that participants who had a high, as compared to low, desire for control were more likely to anthropomorphize a smaller dog whose
actions were quick and unpredictable versus a larger, slower,
and more predictable dog. Similarly, research in gambling con-
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texts has shown that frequent gamblers are more likely to anthropomorphize slot machines (Riva, Sacchi, and Brambilla
2015). Further, consumers who feel powerful believe they
can use that power to control anthropomorphized slot machines and experience lower levels of risk, thereby making
them more likely to play the slot machines (Kim and McGill
2011). As we discuss next, consumers may also anthropomorphize luck itself, and such anthropomorphized luck can
increase risk-seeking by providing a sense of security.

Anthropomorphized Luck and Shared Risk
Consumers differ in their level of risk tolerance (Gibson,
Michayluk, and Van de Venter 2013) and social factors can
have a strong inﬂuence on risk preferences (Zhu et al. 2012;
Duclos et al. 2013). In particular, the presence of other people has been shown to lead to an increase (i.e., the risky shift)
in individuals’ inclination to choose riskier options (Wallach,
Kogan, and Bem 1962; Stoner 1968). Even the mere presence
of others leads to riskier decision-making because other people
can increase feelings of security (Chou and Nordgren 2017).
The latter ﬁnding is consistent with the cushion hypothesis
(Weber and Hsee 1998), which posits that individuals from
a collectivistic (vs. individualistic) society are more likely to
engage in riskier ﬁnancial decision-making because of their
network of others (i.e., friends, family, community) available
to help if needed by providing a ﬁnancial cushion. This sense
of support from others, which includes membership in online
communities, both real and imagined, has also been shown to
increase consumers’ choice of riskier ﬁnancial options (Zhu
et al. 2012).
Thus, the presence of others can increase feelings of security, consequently leading to riskier decisions. Importantly,
anthropomorphized entities are often ascribed essential human characteristics, such as a human-like mind capable of rational thought (Gray, Gray, and Wegner 2007), and they also
facilitate emotional bonding (Kim and McGill 2011) and produce cooperation (Kiesler and Goetz 2002). Thus, and consistent with Bixter and Luhmann (2014), it is possible that
anthropomorphized entities may also create the perception
that they share the risk present in a decision, akin to those
produced by human entities. Therefore, we anticipate that anthropomorphized (vs. objectiﬁed) luck increases preference
for higher-risk ﬁnancial alternatives, and that this effect is
guided by shared risk perceptions. Further, the effect of anthropomorphism on risk-taking should be observed for decisions to be made alone, but attenuated for shared decisions
in which feelings of security can be provided by the presence
of other people.
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We test our propositions in four studies. Data exclusions
were based on a common set of screeners; namely, we removed participants who failed attention checks (see appendix; apps. 1–4 are available online) or whose responses were
outliers (1/2 3 SD) with respect to time spent on the decision. We controlled for gender in our analyses given gender
differences in risk-taking (Charness and Gneezy 2012).
ST UDY 1

The objectives of study 1 were threefold. First, to explore if
some consumers spontaneously anthropomorphize luck, we
measured consumers’ propensity to anthropomorphize luck;
subsequent studies manipulate this construct. Second, we
sought to examine shared risk perceptions as the underlying
driver of the effect. Third, we wanted to examine an alternative explanation based on differences in feelings of hopefulness (Darke and Freedman 1997) engendered by anthropomorphized versus objectiﬁed luck.

Method
One hundred and ﬁfty MTurk panelists (49% male, Mage 5
40:87, SD 5 12:50) completed an online study, which consisted of a one measured factor (i.e., consumers’ propensity
to anthropomorphize luck). Participants were informed that
they would be asked to complete several unrelated studies,
the ﬁrst of which involved a ﬁnancial risk decision (Duclos
et al. 2013). They then read the following brief deﬁnition
of ﬁnancial capital: “Financial capital is deﬁned as the amount
of money that you have earned and at your disposal. Financial capital can be quantiﬁed in dollars, such that the more
dollars you accrue, the more ﬁnancial capital you possess.”
Next, they were asked to imagine that they had ﬁnancial capital of $100 but had the opportunity to potentially increase
it through a lottery. After that, they were given two lottery
options—Lottery A had an 80% chance of winning $500
and a 20% chance of winning nothing (i.e., low-risk option),
and Lottery B had a 20% chance of winning $2,400 and an
80% chance of losing $100 (i.e., high-risk option)—and were
asked to indicate their relative lottery preference (1 5 Lottery Option A, 9 5 Lottery Option B).
Next, we assessed shared risk perceptions with the following two items (1 5 not at all, 9 5 very much; r 5 :89): “To
what extent did you feel like the ﬁnancial risk was shared
with others;” and “To what extent did you feel like the ﬁnancial risk was a shared responsibility.” To examine an alternative explanation based on feelings of hopefulness, suggesting
that anthropomorphized versus objectiﬁed luck renders consumers more hopeful and thereby changes their risk prefer-

ences, we also measured the extent to which participants felt
hopeful (1 5 not at all, 9 5 very much). Finally, participants
responded to ﬁve items adapted from Waytz, Cacioppo, and
Epley (2010) that measured participants’ propensity to anthropomorphize luck, which included items such as “To what
extent does luck have intentions?” (0 5 not at all, 10 5 very
much; a 5 :90; see app. 1). Ten participants who failed an
attention check, two participants whose time spent on the ﬁnancial risk scenario exceeded three standard deviations from
the mean (M 5 33:96 seconds), and one participant whose
propensity to anthropomorphize luck score exceeded three
standard deviations from the mean (M 5 3:17) were excluded,
resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 137 participants.

Results
We conducted a regression analysis, including gender as a
covariate. As expected, regressing participants’ propensity
to anthropomorphize luck on relative risk preference while
controlling for gender yielded a signiﬁcant simple effect
(b 5 :25, t 5 3:81, p < :001), such that greater likelihood
of anthropomorphizing luck was positively associated with
preference for the riskier option (i.e., Lottery B). To examine the mediating role of shared risk, we used Model 4 from
PROCESS (Hayes 2013). Bootstrapping involving 10,000
resamples from the data revealed that the effect of participants’ propensity to anthropomorphize luck on their relative ﬁnancial risk preference was mediated by perceptions
of shared risk (b 5 :05, SE 5 :03; 95% CI [.0018, .1295]).
A follow-up analysis with the inclusion of hopefulness as
a parallel mediator yielded only the mediating effect of perceptions of shared risk (b 5 :05, SE 5 :03; 95% CI [.0023,
.1322]), but not hopefulness (b 5 2:002, SE 5 :008, 95% CI
[2.0238, .0091]).
Discussion
As hypothesized, study 1 conﬁrmed a positive association between consumers’ propensity to anthropomorphize luck and
greater ﬁnancial risk-taking, and that such decisions are driven
by shared risk perceptions. This result is consistent with our
proposition that evoking the mere anthropomorphizing of a
nonhuman entity (i.e., lady luck) increases risk-seeking by
providing a sense of security in contexts with uncontrollable
outcomes. Further support for this explanation would be provided if the anthropomorphizing of luck no longer shifted
preferences to riskier alternatives as perceived control over
the decision outcome increases. In particular, risky decisions
are not conﬁned to the ﬁnancial domain—for example, consumers are often faced with decisions that involve social risk,
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such as those that can lead to social exclusion (Mandel 2003)
or affect their social standing among peers or coworkers
(Schultz and Moore 1986). However, in contrast to the ﬁnancial domain in which outcomes are likely seen as determined
by chance, consumers may perceive that they have more control over outcomes in the social domain and, therefore, feel
less in need of the security provided by an anthropomorphized entity. Thus, our next study examines risk domain
as a moderator to the effect of anthropomorphized luck on
risky decision-making, such that the increased preference
for risky alternatives when luck is anthropomorphized versus
objectiﬁed should be observed for risks in the ﬁnancial, but
not social, domain.
ST UDY 2

Method
One hundred and ninety-six Mturk panelists (41% male,
Mage 5 37:06, SD 5 11:79 ) completed a study that consisted of a 2 (luck: objectiﬁed vs. anthropomorphized) 
2 (risk domain: ﬁnancial vs. social) between-subjects design. Participants were informed that they would complete
an initial study to gauge writing ability; those in the anthropomorphized luck condition were asked to describe luck as
if it had come to life, whereas their counterparts in the objectiﬁed luck condition simply were asked to describe luck
(adapted from Aggarwal and McGill 2012; see app. 2a for
a pretest of the manipulation).
In an ostensibly unrelated study, participants were then
randomly assigned to make an investment decision in either
the ﬁnancial or social domain, which involved investing ﬁnancial capital or social capital. Those in the ﬁnancial risk condition were provided with a deﬁnition of ﬁnancial capital as in
study 1, whereas those in the social risk condition received the
following deﬁnition of social capital: “Social capital is deﬁned
as the amount of goodwill, trust, and inﬂuence that you have
earned and at your disposal, particularly in the workplace. Social capital can be quantiﬁed in points, such that the more
points that you accrue, the more social capital you possess.”
Participants were then presented with a risky decision
adapted from Kupor, Liu, and Amir (2018). Those in the ﬁnancial (social) risk condition read that they had up to $100
(100 social capital points) to invest in a potential high-risk opportunity that had a 10% chance of success, but that could
yield 20 times their investment. If the investment failed, however, they would lose the entire investment amount. We pretested the two scenarios with a separate sample of 103 Mturk
participants (41% male, M age 5 38:63, SD 5 12:54; see
app. 2b). Results showed that perceived risk inherent in the
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decision did not differ between the ﬁnancial and social risk
scenarios (M 5 6:08, SD 5 1:30 vs. M 5 5:78, SD 5 1:22;
F(1; 100) 5 1:40, p 5 :24); however, participants in the
social risk condition felt they could control the decision’s outcomes to a greater extent than those in the ﬁnancial risk condition (M 5 2:90, SD 5 1:34 vs. M 5 2:24, SD 5 1:26;
F(1; 100) 5 6:65, p 5 :01).
Participants in the main study were then instructed to indicate the investment they wanted to make (0–100), followed
by manipulation checks assessing the extent to which their investment involved ﬁnancial risk and the extent to which their
investment involved social risk (1 5 not at all, 7 5 very much).
Finally, they provided demographic information. Twelve participants who failed an attention check and three participants whose time spent on the ﬁnancial risk scenario exceeded
three standard deviations from the mean (M 5 33:96 seconds)
were excluded, resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 181 participants.

Results
Analyses of the manipulation checks showed that our risk
domain manipulation was successful (see app. 2d). Next, a
two-way ANCOVA with investment decision as dependent
variable, luck condition and risk domain as independent
variables, and gender as covariate yielded a main effect of
the gender covariate (F(1; 176 5 8:0, p 5 :005), and more
importantly, a signiﬁcant luck  risk domain interaction
(F(1; 176) 5 5:59, p 5 :02; see ﬁg. 1). In particular, and consistent with our expectations, within the ﬁnancial risk condition, participants made riskier ﬁnancial decisions following the evocation of anthropomorphized versus objectiﬁed
luck (M 5 43:63, SD 5 30:25 vs. M 5 33:42, SD 5 27:0,

Figure 1. Study 2: Effect of risk domain on preference on investment amount as a function of luck type.
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respectively; F(1; 176) 5 3:51, p 5 :06). On the other hand,
participants in the objectiﬁed (M 5 37:11, SD 5 26:42)
versus anthropomorphized (M 5 28:83, SD 5 20:63) luck
condition made marginally greater social risk investments
(F(1; 176) 5 2:67, p 5 :10). Further, and indicating that
shared risk perceptions provided by anthropomorphized luck
are domain-speciﬁc, participants in the evoked anthropomorphized luck condition risked signiﬁcantly more ﬁnancial
than social capital (M 5 43:63, SD 5 30:25 vs. M 5 28:83,
SD 5 20:63, respectively; F(1; 176) 5 7:11, p 5 :008). There
were no differences in investment allocation in the objectiﬁed luck condition between the ﬁnancial and social risk decisions (M 5 33:42, SD 5 27:01 vs. M 5 37:11, SD 5 26:42,
respectively; F(1; 176) 5 :49, p 5 :49).

Discussion
Study 2 once again demonstrated that participants who evoked
anthropomorphized versus objectiﬁed luck engaged in riskier
ﬁnancial decisions. On the other hand, and consistent with
our theory, this effect was eliminated (i.e., marginally reversed)
when making investments in a social context. Of course, even
for decisions involving ﬁnancial risk, relying on lady luck to
share one’s risk is unlikely to be uniform among consumers.
Given that maladaptive behaviors related to ﬁnancial risk,
which include gambling and compulsive spending, are suggestive of actions that result from repeated, escalating occurrences (Black 2007), such continuous exposure likely
heightens the need for an increased sense of control and security. Indeed, prior research has shown that frequent (vs. infrequent) gamblers displayed more irrational thinking toward
gambling choices (Ladouceur et al. 1988) and demonstrated
more superstitious beliefs related to winning and controlling chance outcomes (Moore and Ohtsuka 1999). Because
of this positive relationship between the increased need for
control and frequent gambling (Grifﬁths 1990), individuals
who frequently engage in risky decisions should be more
likely to employ anthropomorphized luck as a strategy that
offers an illusion of control. Thus, we expect that the anthropomorphism of luck should have a greater effect for
those who engage in risky decision-making more (vs. less)
frequently.
ST UDY 3

Method
Four hundred and thirty-eight Mturk participants (52% male,
Mage 5 36:16, SD 5 22:87) completed a study that consisted
of one manipulated factor (luck: anthropomorphized vs. objectiﬁed vs. control) and one measured factor (frequency of

engaging in risky decisions, continuous). Similar to prior studies, participants were ﬁrst introduced to a writing assessment
that provided the cover story for the luck evocation manipulation, and were randomly assigned to one of three luck conditions, such that they either wrote about luck as a person
(anthropomorphized condition), luck (objectify condition) or
their typical day (control condition).
All participants were then shown a ﬁnancial risk scenario.
They were asked to imagine that they had $100 and had been
presented with an opportunity to increase their ﬁnancial capital and could choose between the following two lottery options: Lottery A with an 80% chance of winning $500 and a
20% chance of winning nothing (i.e., low-risk option) and Lottery B with a 20% chance of winning $2,400 and an 80%
chance of losing $100 (i.e., high-risk option). Participants then
indicated their relative preference between the two options
on a nine-point bipolar scale (1 5 Lottery A, 9 5 Lottery B).
Finally, they reported how often they engage in risky decisions (1 5 never, 7 5 very frequently) and demographic information. Fifty-one participants who failed an attention check
embedded within the study, and three participants whose
time spent on the ﬁnancial risk scenario exceeded three standard deviations from the mean (M 5 29:69 seconds) were
excluded, resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 384 participants.

Results
We conducted a regression with relative lottery preference
as dependent variable, luck condition (coded as a multicategorical variable) and risk frequency and their interaction as independent variables, and gender as covariate. Following Hayes
and Preacher (2014)’s suggestion regarding multicategorical
independent variables, we created two dummy variables, X1
and X2, representing the objectiﬁed luck and the control conditions, respectively. Therefore, all conditions were retained
in the initial analysis. The ﬁrst contrast compared the anthropomorphized luck condition to the objectiﬁed luck condition.
The second contrast compared the anthropomorphized luck
condition to the control condition. Overall, we found a simple
effect of frequency of engaging in risky decisions (b 5 :96,
t 5 6:51, p < :001), and simple effects of luck in the ﬁrst contrast (b 5 2:51, t 5 21:92, p 5 :056) and second contrast
(b 5 2:74, t 5 22:78, p 5 :006), and as hypothesized, a
luck  frequency interaction in both the ﬁrst (b 5 2:42,
t 5 22:21, p 5 :03; see ﬁg. 2A) and second (b 5 2:56, t 5
23:04, p 5 :003; see ﬁg. 2B) contrasts.
Next, we conducted spotlight analyses (1/2 1 SD from
the mean [M 5 3:58]) at high and low levels of risk frequency.
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Figure 2. A, Study 3: Effect of frequency of engaging in risky decisions on preference for high ﬁnancial risk option as a function of luck type.
B, Study 3: Effect of frequency of engaging in risky decisions on preference for high ﬁnancial risk option as a function of luck type.

Among participants who frequently engaged in risky decisions (11 SD), those in the anthropomorphized luck condition indicated a greater preference for the high-risk lottery
option (M 5 4:56) compared to those in either the objectiﬁed luck (M 5 3:43, b 5 21:13, t 5 22:88, p 5 :004) or
control (M 5 2:99, b 5 21:57, t 5 24:19, p <:001) conditions. However, among participants who engage in risky
decisions only infrequently (21 SD), there were no differences in relative lottery preference between the anthropomorphized luck condition (M 5 1:73) compared to those in the
objectiﬁed luck condition (M 5 1:83, b 5 :10, t 5 :27, p 5
:79) or the control condition (M 5 1:83, b 5 :03, t 5 :26,
p 5 :80).
Additional analyses were conducted comparing the anthropomorphized luck condition to the objectiﬁed luck and
control conditions separately. When examining the anthropomorphized versus objectiﬁed luck conditions, a ﬂoodlight analysis using Johnson-Neyman tests revealed a signiﬁcant effect of evoked luck on relative lottery preference
at frequency of risky decision scores greater than .10 (bJN 5
2:53, SE 5 :27, p 5 :05). Participants who frequently engaged in risky decisions (above .10) reported a greater
preference for the high-risk option when luck was anthropomorphized (vs. objectiﬁed). A second analysis examined the
anthropomorphized and control conditions; the resulting
ﬂoodlight analysis found a signiﬁcant effect of luck on relative lottery preference at frequency of risky decision scores
greater than 2.39 (bJN 5 2:27, SE 5 :14, p 5 :05). Once
again, participants who frequently engage in risky decisions
(above 2.39) reported a greater preference for the high-risk
option when luck was anthropomorphized (vs. control).

Discussion
Results from study 3 provided evidence that while the anthropomorphizing of luck can lead to an increased preference for high-risk ﬁnancial alternatives, its detrimental impact is more pronounced for individuals who frequently (vs.
infrequently) engage in risky decision-making. Given that
maladaptive ﬁnancial behaviors often result from repeated
decisions within a given domain, the increased deleterious
impact on consumers’ preferences for high-risk alternatives
suggests that it can further contribute to such maladaptive
behaviors. Our ﬁnal study seeks to provide additional evidence of perceived risk-sharing provided by lady luck guiding the observed increase in high-risk choices by employing
a mediation by moderation design (Spencer, Zanna, and
Fong 2005). We expect to replicate the effect of anthropomorphism on risk-seeking in the absence of others who
might provide feelings of shared risk, but not when the decision is made jointly with others who can share the risk inherent in the decision.
ST U DY 4

Method
Two hundred and thirty-three undergraduate students
(56% male, M age 5 20:56, SD 5 3:48) from a large US university completed this study for course credit. The study
consisted of two manipulated factors (luck: anthropomorphized vs. objectiﬁed; risk: individual vs. shared) and one
measured factor (frequency of engaging in risky decisions,
continuous). Participants were randomly assigned to a scenario that involved either an individual or shared risk (adapted
from He, Inman, and Mittal 2008). Speciﬁcally, they were
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asked to imagine that they had been working in corporate
for the past ﬁve years since graduation, and while they enjoyed their career, they had always known that eventually they
would like to be self-employed. As a result, they had been saving funds to eventually invest-and currently had $5,000. Next,
those in the individual risk condition were told that they had
decided to invest in a local start-up business as a ﬁrst step,
whereas those in the shared risk condition were told that they
and three friends from college had decided to invest in a local
start-up business as a ﬁrst step, together investing $20,000. A
pretest with 83 Mturk participants (46% male, M age 5 41:47,
SD 5 12:55; see app. 4a) revealed feeling more supported
in the shared versus individual risk condition (M 5 4:66,
SD 5 1:08 vs. M 5 4:05,SD 5 1:50, respectively; F(1; 80) 5
4:30, p 5 :04 ). They also felt that risk was shared with others
to a greater extent in the shared versus individual risk condition (M 5 5:39, SD 5 1:48 vs. M 5 2:87, SD 5 1:61, respectively; F(1; 80) 5 53:55, p < :001).
Next, all participants in the main study were presented
with two investment options. Option A had a 45% chance
of earning a 16% return, a 10% chance of earning a 7% return,
and a 45% chance of incurring a loss of 2%. Option B had a
100% chance of earning a 4% return. Then, participants randomly assigned to the anthropomorphized (objectiﬁed) luck
condition were told to remember that lady luck (luck) was
on their side. They next indicated their relative investment
preference on a nine-item scale (1 5 Option A, 9 5 Option B;
reverse-coded), how often they engaged in risky decisions
(1 5 never, 7 5 frequently), and demographic information.
Twenty-three participants failed an attention check and two

participants whose time spent on the ﬁnancial risk scenario
exceeded three standard deviations from the mean (M 5
43:04 seconds) were excluded, resulting in a ﬁnal sample
of 208.

Results
We conducted a regression analysis with investment preference as dependent variable, luck condition (objectiﬁed 5 0,
anthropomorphized 5 1), risk condition (0 5 individual, 1 5
shared), frequency of risky decisions (mean-centered) and
their interactions as independent variables, and gender as
covariate. Analysis yielded a signiﬁcant simple effect of frequency of risky decisions (b 5 :45, t 5 3:86, p 5 :0002).
More critically, a signiﬁcant interaction among the three independent variables emerged (b 5 2:94, t 5 22:02, p 5 :04).
To explore this three-way interaction, we tested for luck
condition  frequency of risky decision interactions in the
individual and shared risk conditions separately (see ﬁg. 3).
Replicating our previous ﬁndings, a signiﬁcant evoked luck 
frequency of risky decision interaction was detected when
the ﬁnancial risk was individual (b 5 :57, t 5 1:73, p 5:09),
but not when the ﬁnancial risk was shared (b 5 2:36,
t 5 21:11, p 5 :27). We conducted follow-up analyses in
the individual risk condition that examined preferences
within each luck condition. When luck was anthropomorphized, participants who frequently (vs. infrequently) engaged in risky decisions expressed greater preferences for
the high-risk option (b 5 :87, t 5 3:78, p 5 :0003). However, in the objectiﬁed luck condition, frequency of engaging
in risky decisions did not impact risk preferences (b 5 :30,

Figure 3. A, Study 4: Effect of frequency of engaging in risky decisions on preference for high ﬁnancial risk option as a function of luck type
and individual risk. B, Study 4: Effect of frequency of engaging in risky decisions on preference for high ﬁnancial risk option as a function of
luck type and shared risk.
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t 5 1:28, p 5 :21). Floodlight analysis revealed a signiﬁcant
evoked luck effect on preference for the high-risk option at
frequency of risky decision scores greater than 2.09 (bJN 5
1:67, SE 5 :84, p 5 :05): those who frequently engaged in
risky decisions reported a greater preference for the high-risk
option when luck was anthropomorphized.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

This research demonstrates that anthropomorphizing (vs.
objectifying) luck may lead to a greater preference for highrisk ﬁnancial alternatives, consistent with the proposition that
anthropomorphized luck can engender shared risk perceptions. Given that many maladaptive consumer behaviors,
such as compulsive shopping, emerge from repeated behaviors (Black 2007), we also identiﬁed a key moderator to this
effect—frequency of risky decision-making. In particular, the
anthropomorphizing of luck leads to greater selection of highrisk ﬁnancial alternatives among consumers who more frequently engage in risky decision-making.
With an increased focus on consumer welfare, research
investigating the antecedents of maladaptive consumption
behaviors are becoming increasingly important. Our ﬁndings
thus contribute to research involving risky ﬁnancial decisionmaking by showing that consumers’ propensity to select an
option with more (vs. less) risk may be inﬂuenced by the attribution of human-like characteristics to luck. Further, we
also add to a richer understanding of how social inﬂuences,
characterized by the perceived presence of anthropomorphized
entities, impact risk-taking decisions.
The current research holds signiﬁcant public policy implications. From a consumer’s ﬁnancial welfare perspective,
policy makers may consider requiring marketers to qualify
references to anthropomorphized luck, particularly when
consumers may be vulnerable to taking undue ﬁnancial
risks, such as in gambling establishments or when making
investment decisions. For example, our research suggests that
a sign in a casino insinuating that “Lady Luck is on Your Side”
could lead gamblers to engage in higher-risk behaviors than
a sign that simply suggests that “Luck is on Your Side” or one
that says “Good Luck.” Indeed, marketers have relied on lady
luck to facilitate increased consumer participation in lotteries and gambles: there are Lady Luck scratch-off tickets, and
Lady Luck slot machines and playing cards. Lady Luck was
even the spokesperson for the Virginia State Lottery. Thus,
consumer advocates may propose limiting the use of lady
luck to prevent increased ﬁnancial risk taking and other maladaptive consumer behaviors, especially in light of scratchoff lottery tickets being the most widespread form of gam-
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bling in the US (Barnes et al. 2011), which is extremely popular among lower SES consumers for whom ﬁnancial losses
could be devastating (Ariyabuddhiphongs 2011).
There are, of course, many instances when consumers
might enhance their welfare by greater risk-seeking. For example, one of the reasons driving status quo bias (Samuelson
and Zeckhauser 1988) is that sticking with the status quo alternative is perceived to be less risky than switching to another option, even if it provides relatively greater beneﬁts.
Thus, to encourage switching away from outdated brands or
product models, unhealthy foods, initial health plans or retirement portfolios, marketers may invoke anthropomorphized luck, lowering the perceived risk inherent in making
the switch, and nudge consumers to transition to alternative
offerings.
Our ﬁndings provide numerous opportunities for future
research. In particular, given the ubiquity of “Lady Luck” in
the vernacular, we focused on the effect of anthropomorphizing luck itself on risky decision-making. However, future research might explore if anthropomorphizing tools employed
as part of a risky ﬁnancial transaction, such as stock versus
bond trades made on anthropomorphized smartphones, tablets, or laptops, replicate the effect we documented. As well, it
would be interesting to examine if anthropomorphizing other
luck-related items, such as four-leaf clovers or horseshoes,
also engenders perceptions of risk-sharing. Moreover, future
research may consider other domains in which high-risk behaviors are prevalent, such as activities related to health risks.
Finally, future research might make use of tools from neuroscience, such as electroencephalography (EEG) or functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to better understand risky
decision-making and how these continued behaviors become
maladaptive (Clithero, Karmakar, and Hsu 2021; Turel and
Bechara 2021).
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